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DAVID E. MILLS, 
DIVIDING THE NILE. EGYPT’S ECONOMIC 
NATIONALISTS IN THE SUDAN, 1918-56
CAIRO, NEW YORK, 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF CAIRO PRESS, 2014
The “Unity of the Nile Valley” (wahda wadi al-nil), which was the term that evoked a popular political ideology that was widespread in Sudan and 
Egypt until the 1950s, described a peculiar form of nationalism. Its ideologues 
did not postulate that Sudan and Egypt were one nation, but that they were 
two halves that had been unjustly separated but were destined to be reunited. 
For the Egyptians, sharing the river Nile made Sudan a natural appendix of 
Egypt, while for many Sudanese, Egypt was a “blood brother” with which they 
shared a set of fundamental national traits.
This book makes an important contribution to the abundant literature on 
Sudanese and Egyptian relations in the twentieth century in two ways: first, 
because it covers afacet – its economic aspects – that has been systematically 
neglected in studies on nationalism, and second, because it goes much further 
than any previous research – at least any that is known to this reviewer – on how 
Egyptian-Sudanese economic relations functioned from an Egyptian perspective. 
The main argument underlying this book is that Egyptian politicians failed 
to pass effective measures to bind the Egyptian and Sudanese economies 
together, and that this was one of the reasons why, despite the endless discus-
sions and speeches on the importance of concluding the Unity of the Nile 
Valley, it never became a reality. Egyptian politicians were aware of the impor-
tance of creating an economic framework for unity, and developed strategies 
to make the two economies more interdependent, but their efforts came to 
nothing each time. The book under review recounts the story of these failed 
attempts. I shall first describe its content, and then move on to my analysis.
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In the first chapter, the author addresses the question of whether the idea 
of “Unity of the Nile Valley” corresponded to a ‘reality’ of people who had 
been “ethnically and racially united for millennia” (p. 15). His answer, like 
that of many Sudanese nationalists, is that there were as many differences as 
there were affinities. The very geography of the Nile is a case in point: accord-
ing to which pair of eyes is doing the looking, the Nile can be viewed as 
either a symbol of unity or a symbol of division. This same river that flows 
through the two countries is punctuated by six cataracts north of Khartoum, 
which make navigation difficult and dangerous.
The second chapter explores the various Egyptian agreements with Sudan 
as regards both the waters of the Nile and Sudan development projects. 
Although they were praised as victories for the Egyptian government and evi-
dence of Egyptian involvement in Sudan, these agreements also fostered 
separation in many different ways: the1929 agreement, for instance, author-
ized a separate administration of the Nile waters. Moreover, large 
infrastructural works (such as the Jabal Awliya dam) and development projects 
(such as the Lake Tana project), which were financed in large part by Egypt, 
fostered the expansion of a cotton monoculture, which came to compete 
directly with that of Egypt. Chapter 3 pursues the issues raised in Chapter 2, 
and describes the new phase in the financial relations between the two coun-
tries that was inaugurated by the 1936 Treaty, when the Second World War 
was looming and Britain had to rush to secure its position in Egypt. As a note 
of criticism, the two chapters would have benefited from including more 
background to Sudanese history. In fact, the crisis of 1924 (for the Sudanese, 
the Revolution of 1924), which the author only refers to, without explaining 
it, was a watershed in Egyptian-Sudanese relations. Prior to 1924, thousands 
of Egyptians worked in either the Sudanese administration or the army (Sudan 
did not have its own army at that time; it was created as a consequence of 
1924). 1 Moreover, according to the tables on trade reported by the author in 
the chapters that follow, trading patterns appear to have been more in favour 
to Egypt than they were in subsequent decades. In any event, the majority of 
Egyptians were evacuated from Sudan after 1924 because they had been 
blamed for being primarily responsible for the 1924 Revolution. From this 
perspective, the 1936 Treaty represented a new beginning, and civil adminis-
tration and trade were reopened to Egyptians. Egyptians politicians then 
sought to make up for lost time, and a series of institutions were created to 
foster trade with Sudan, which the author reports in detail, such as the posi-
tion of Egypt’s Economic Expert and the funding of a permanent Khartoum 
1. According to Beshir, in 1920 there were 1,795 Egyptian employees in the various 
government departments, compared with 1,523 Sudanese, 506 British, 166 Syrians 
and 102 “Others”. Beshir, M. O. 1969, Educational Development in the Sudan, 1898-
1956, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 198.
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Exhibition as a window for selected Egyptian goods. Each of these initiatives 
was ultimately ineffective, however.
Chapter 4 describeswhat was perhaps the main obstacletotrade: transport. 
In spite of the rapid constructionof a railway line between Wadi Halfa and 
Khartoum in 1887, during theexpedition against the Mahdiyya, the line was-
not extended anyfurther, which meant that it ended in Wadi Halfa in Sudan 
and began againin Shellal, in Egypt. The movement of goods and people 
between these two points was a burdensome business: merchandise had to be 
unloaded from the train, inspected by customs, loaded on to a steamship, 
unloaded and inspected again, and then reloaded on to a different train, all in 
the terrible heat of a desert climate. Sea transportation was not always a feasi-
ble alternative: although the distance was certainly shorter, it was much more 
expensive than the overland route. Besides this already formidable obstacle, 
Egyptian traders had to pay a multitude of fees (such as the annual fee for 
commercial permits or export certificates from the administration), even 
though the free circulation of goods (meaning tax-free) between the two coun-
tries had been established from the outset. In a similar fashion, the 1936 
Treaty recognized the free circulation of Egyptian people, but they still had to 
obtain a visa and pay a fee to travel to Sudan.
Chapter 5 focuses on Egyptian investments in Sudanese agricultural land. 
Any efforts in this area were hindered by the fact that right from the start, the 
Sudanese government imposed severe restrictions on foreigners acquiring 
land in Sudan, making it virtually impossible to do so. The Egyptian national-
ist elite thought of other ways to occupy Sudanese soil, namely by encouraging 
peasants to move there, partly to solve the overpopulation problem, but in 
spite of repeated talks, very little was actually done, in part because Sudan 
was not attractive to most Egyptians.
Chapters 6 and 7 are respectively dedicated to Egyptian exports to Sudan 
and to Sudanese imports to Egypt. Sudan depended on Egypt for only a few 
products, but none occupied a central role in the Egyptian economy. The first of 
these was “a cotton-silk/artificial silk mixture produced by Egyptian artisans of 
Naqqada in Upper Egypt that had a well-established, exclusive market in the 
Sudan” (p. 192). The most important item of the Egyptian economy, cotton 
piece-goods, did not find a market in Sudan, on the other hand; the piece-goods 
sold by other international producers, first of all Japan, but also India, Italy, and 
Britain, were far more competitive. The second most important Egyptian export 
item was sugar; it was so essential to Sudanese life, however, that it quickly 
became a Sudan government monopoly, and was sold by the government to 
retailers at a much higher price than that at which Egyptians sold it to the gov-
ernment. Trading with Sudan was not, therefore, a lucrative business.
On the other hand, apart from cotton, Egypt was one of the main importers 
of Sudanese raw and semi-raw materials: wood, untanned hides, sesame 
seeds and later cotton seeds, dhurra (millet) and other grains, and last but not 
least, livestock. Except for livestock, however, the market was characterized 
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by large annual fluctuations, because the two markets were not interdepend-
ent but complementary: peaks of sales occurred either when Egypt had special 
needs for certain Sudanese goods or when Sudan produced more than usual. 
In the case of livestock, however, Egypt relied almost completely on Sudanese 
imports. It should be emphasized that cattle was central to Sudanese eco-
nomic and social life; for instance, herders preferred to keep their cattle if the 
sale price was too low. The cattle trade was heavily regulated by the govern-
ment, however, and had to observe a number of cumbersome procedures, 
such as the clearance of the “certificate of purchase from a public market or a 
certificate of export from a provincial governor”, the use of licensed steam-
ships on the Halfa-Shellal route, and quarantine (p. 247). 
By the end of the volume, the reader will undoubtedly have learnt a number 
of important characteristics of Sudanese-Egyptian trade: both the Sudanese and 
Egyptian administrations prioritized policies that facilitated the expansion of 
international trade rather than do business with each other. “The only partici-
pant in the economy with a distinct advantage was the Sudanese Government” 
(p. 179), argues the author, and he explains that government strategy was two-
fold: to protect its citizens from foreign exploiters (by not selling lands to 
foreigners, including Egyptians), and to capture most of the benefits of 
import-export flows. This was the principle underlying customs policies, for 
instance: the Sudan government preferred to keep customs duties low (in con-
trast to Egyptian policy)in order to attract more foreign goods to Sudan, rather 
than to increase them to favour a local (Egyptian-Sudanese) market that would 
eventually have discouraged international investors and lowered the income 
from customs procedures (p. 197). Therefore, while the Sudan Government did 
not implement any specific measures to hamper Egyptian trade with Sudan, it 
did nothing to encourage or protect it either. Even though Egyptian goods circu-
lated inside Sudan tax-free, most were not competitive enough to win Sudanese 
markets. On the other hand, the Egyptian government never invested in any-
thing more substantial than feasibility studies to boost its economic partnership. 
At a time when “slow research” is a luxury, this work is particularly praise-
worthy. The author has sifted through an impressive amount of Arabic sources 
in the National Archives of Cairo, a site that it is usually difficult to access, 
including the series of journals published by various Egyptian chambers of 
commerce, the most important Arabic newspapers of the time, minutes of par-
liamentary debates, and Egyptian government reports. Similarly, the author 
shows an impressive command of the secondary literature in Arabic: it is quite 
rare in works on Middle Eastern Studies in English to find a bibliography in 
Arabic that is as long as the English one, as is the case here.
My criticism of the book must be made from the perspective of an histo-
rian of colonial Sudan. As the author himself admits when he writes “This 
study is ultimately a history of Egyptians” (p. 2), the book’s weak aspect is its 
limited use of Sudanese history and Sudanese perspectives. Although is true 
that it is not the author’s purpose to look at the question through Sudanese 
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eyes, and that this is not a book on the social history of the Sudanese econ-
omy, a more intimate look at Sudan would have been beneficial. The first 
glaring absence is a discussion of the milestones in Sudanese history and its 
periodization. Sudan has experienced very different administrative phases 
that corresponded to very different ideas on native policies and practices, and 
this in turn had repercussions on the Sudanese attitude towards Egypt and 
Egyptians. Besides the case of 1924, which I have mentioned above, the 
Second World War also marked a divide in native policy between the pre-war 
era of Indirect Rule and the new development policies of late colonialism. 
Even an outline of the general framework would have helped the reader place 
some of the institutions and initiatives the book mentions diachronically, and 
given a sense of historical change. In addition, the main question asked by the 
book is why and how certain Egyptian economic policies did not succeed, 
but it does not address the question of historical change. Learning about 
causes and reasons, however, sometimes has the effect of flattening the phe-
nomena being described.
A case in point is the discussion in the first chapter about the Unity of the 
Nile Valley. The author wonders whether this motto was merely a discourse or 
was instead something ‘real’. The problem with the answer he gives(“it was 
somehow unreal”) is that it does not take account of them any ways in which 
the idea of unity of the Nile Valley can be understood, as well as the complex 
relationship the Sudanese havewith it. Egypt represented different things to 
different people at any one time: for many people, Egypt was a popular sym-
bol of anti-colonialism, while for others it was a hated symbol of oppression, 
as was the case for the victims of Turco-Egyptian rule (1821-1885). Many 
looked onEgypt as a site of modernity, intellectual inspiration and learning, 
however, and byreading about Egypt and learning from Egyptians,the 
Sudanese were in a position toidentifya host of stimulating techniques, from 
how to print a newspaperand run a radio station to how to write a novel and 
how to protest. Finally, for many people, Egypt represented family. 
This is particularly evident in the case of Sudanese-Egyptian merchants. In 
a final important section of Chapter 7, the author examines the traders who 
were engaged in Egyptian-Sudanese commerce. True, the most important 
import-export companies were multinationals owned by foreigners, such as 
the Tutunji family, which was of Syrian origin, while others were Greeks, 
Armenians, British, Italians, Americans, Indians, and so on. According to the 
author, “a fair characterization of the Egyptian entrepreneur in the Sudan 
would be an individual most active in northern and less developed Sudanese 
regions, with often long-established business relations and reliant on less 
lucrative commercial spheres” (p. 258). On the other hand, he argues, 
between 1930 and 1950, new Egyptian merchants found it difficult to estab-
lish their trade in Sudan (p. 264). Several of these points are convincing, 
notably the fact that no new Egyptian company managed to create a fortune 
in Sudan after 1936. On the other hand, it is more difficult to accept the 
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argument that this kind of less lucrative trade did not foster Nile Valley nation-
alism, and, second, that Sudanese-Egyptian local traders were an insignificant 
part of Sudan’s economy.
Authors such as Kapteijns and Spaulding, Ewald, Bjørkelo and Manger 
have described the peculiar, cosmopolitan nature of Sudanese tradeat least 
from the nineteenth century, 2and as Mills also notes, Egyptian traders 
depended onthe Sudanese. They did more than this, however: they also mar-
ried them, and established family networks that extended between the two 
countries and were the artery of the Sudanese economy. 3During the first two 
decades of the Condominium, the label “Egyptian” defined people in an 
uncertain way. If one looks at the life stories of the “agitators” whom the 
Sudan government describedas Egyptians or muwalladīn (sons of unions 
between an Egyptian and a Sudanese) in 1924,one discovers how changing, 
uncertain, and ambiguous this attribution was. 4 The full story ofwhat hap-
pened to this ‘Egyptian’ community after 1924in terms of a change of identity, 
at a time when the Sudan government was putting all its effort into severing 
the personal and political links between the two countries, still remains to be 
discovered. What is certain is that what it meant to be Egyptian in Sudan must 
have been affected by this. Generally, the position and identity of the Egyptian 
trading community was transformed in accordance with policy changes. 
Considering all of this, it is hard to believe, as the author does, that Sudanese-
Egyptian trading links were not vehicles for nationalism, or that Egyptian trade 
did not foster nationalistic bonds in Sudan. 5
I would argue that the reason why the author underestimates the Egyptian-
Sudanese traders has something to do with the sources he has used, which 
mostly consist of official documents and Egyptian press reports. From the 
2. Bjørkelo, A. J. 1988,Prelude to the Mahdiyya: Peasants and Traders in the Shendi 
Region, 1821-1885, Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ewald, J. J. 1990, Soldiers, Traders, and Slaves: State Formation and Economic 
Transformation in the Greater Nile Valley, 1700-1885, Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press. Manger, L. O. 1984,Trade and Traders in the Sudan, Bergen: University of 
Bergen-University Book Store. Kapteijns, L. and J. Spaulding, 1982, “Precolonial Trade 
between States in the Eastern Sudan, ca 1700 - ca 1900”,African Economic History, 
no. 11: 29-62. 
3. Sharkey, H. J. 2000, “The Egyptian Colonial Presence in the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan, 1898-1932,” in J. Spaulding and S. Beswick, White Nile, Black Blood: War, 
Leadership, and Ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala, Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea 
Press, pp. 279-314.
4. I have discussed the question of Egyptian presence in Sudan at several points 
here: Vezzadini, E. 2015,Lost Nationalism: Revolution, Memory and Anti-Colonial 
Resistance in Sudan, Woodbridge, Suffolk, (GB); Rochester, NY, (US): James Currey.
5. People whom the Sudan Government defined as muwalladīn made up a sizeable 
part of the revolutionary activists of 1924, including three of the five founders of the 
White Flag League nationalist movement.
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numerous quotes he uses, it seems clear that the Egyptian state did not consider 
– and arguably did not “see” at all – this blurred category of small Egyptian-
Sudanese traders as a potential carrier of its nationalist project. Thus, the main 
argument that runs throughout the book – that the failure of Egyptian economic 
endeavours in Sudan was one of the causes that led to the hypothesis of real 
political unity with Egypt being dropped so rapidly when independence came –
is in my view only partially true. It is true because the efforts of the Egyptian 
State were unsuccessful, but it is not true in that many traders who had personal 
links with Egypt genuinely believed in the idea of unity. In Sudan today there are 
perhaps few social categories that have as extensive links to Egypt as the 
Sudanese trading community. What is clear, however, is that there was a fairly 
intractable gap between these Sudanese/Egyptians and the Egyptian political 
elite in Cairo.
In spite of these issues, this book is a real mine of information, and offers 
important pieces of the puzzle of writing a social history of trade in colonial 
Sudan. It is erudite and enlightening, and while not being easy reading – 
mostly due to the author’s dense writing style – for the breadth of the subject it 
covers and the amount of detail and information it includes, itis nevertheless 
an excellent work and rewarding reading.
